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WHY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
MATTERS TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE (AND VICE VERSA)* 
Michael J. Perry** 
Hostility to theory usually means an opposition to other people's theories and an 
oblivion of one's own. I 
[T]he claim that you are not being theoretical only makes you all the more theoreti-
cal, since the claim of the refusal of theory is itself a theoretical position2 
What does it mean to "interpret" a text? What is a "text"? Is 
interpretation a constrained or unconstrained activity? If con-
strained, what are the constraints? 
Such questions constitute a principal area of inquiry in a wide 
variety of discourses, including theology, philosophy, and law. 
Theories of interpretation (including anti-theories),3 in the sense of 
systematically elaborated answers to these questions, are among the 
most hotly debated topics in contemporary intellectual life. 
Is this concern with the nature of interpretation simply an aca-
demic fashion? Or are real-world, flesh-and-blood consequences at 
stake in debates about interpretation? If so, what are those 
consequences? 
* Prepared for presentation to the Prescott Bloom Memorial Symposium on 
"Interpretation and Rights," sponsored by the Williams College Center for the Humanities 
and Social Sciences; held at Williams College on November 3-4, I988. A longer version of 
this essay will appear as a chapter in G. Leyh, ed., Legal Hermeneutics: History, Theory, and 
Practice (Princeton University Press, forthcoming). 
** Professor of Law, Northwestern University. A.B. 1968, Georgetown University; 
J.D. 1973, Columbia University. 
Many colleagues at Northwestern and elsewhere commented on a draft of this essay. I 
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I. This is described as "Eagleton's Law" in Ruthven, Where Logic Rules, TIMES LIT. 
SUPP., Aug. 2I, I987, at 892. Cf T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 
(I983). 
2. Miller. But Are Things as We Think They Are?, TIMES LIT. SUPP., Aug. 9, I987, at 
I I04. 
3. See AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM (W. 
Mitchell ed. I 985); Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction, 
I4 CRITICAL INQUIRY 49 (1987). 
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Against the background of my work in constitutional theory,4 
the particular question I address in this essay is whether anything of 
consequence is at stake in debates about constitutional interpreta-
tion. Whether anything important is at stake in debates about other 
sorts of interpretation, for example, literary interpretation, is a 
question I must leave to others. 
Constitutional practice-by which I mean, roughly, discourse 
about the constitutional legitimacy of political institutions and poli-
cies-is certainly consequential in real-world terms: Constitutional 
discourse (reasoning, argument) influences judges to decide consti-
tutional cases one way rather than another. In this essay I argue 
that constitutional theory matters to constitutional practice, and 
hence to judicial decisions. 
After some preliminary observations about texts and interpre-
tation generally, I indicate how the two principal contending theo-
ries, "originalism" and "nonoriginalism," answer the question of 
what it means, or at least should mean, to "interpret" the Constitu-
tion. (Originalism and nonoriginalism are each partly a theory of 
constitutional interpretation and partly a theory of proper judicial 
role. The question of interpretation and the question of judicial role 
are inextricably linked.) I then explain why constitutional-theoreti-
cal debate, in particular originalist/nonoriginalist debate, matters to 
constitutional practice-and why constitutional practice matters to 
constitutional theory. 
I 
By "text" I mean simply "object of interpretation." If one 
wants to reserve "texts" for some subset of objects of interpreta-
tion-for example, for written objects like poems,s and perhaps also 
for some unwritten objects, like paintings or sonatas-one can refer 
to other kinds of objects of interpretation as "text-analogues." 
Nothing of consequence depends on the terminology. 
To say that something-marks on a page, colors on a canvas, 
sounds, whatever-is a "text" (and not just marks on a page, etc.) is 
to say that something is meaningful: meaning-ful, i.e., full of mean-
4. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); 
M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW, ch. 6 (1988). I want to say something about 
what might seem to some to be an excessive and unseemly self-reliance in this essay: I wrote 
this essay against the background of my other constitutional-theoretical work; indeed. I wrote 
it as something of an appendix to that work, and, so, I have thought it useful, even important, 
to refer to relevant passages in that work at several points. 
5. "Text" is defined in II THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 238 (1933) as, inter 
alia: "The wording of anything written or printed; the structure formed by the words in their 
order; the very words, phrases, and sentences as written." 
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ing. For a person to say that something is a text when that some-
thing is not (yet) meaningful to her-perhaps because it is written 
(constructed, composed) in a language or code she does not under-
stand-is for her to conclude, perhaps only tentatively, that it is a 
text to someone, that it is, potentially at least, meaningful to some-
one, perhaps even to her. 
Given the variety of objects for interpretation, can anything 
useful be said about interpretation generally? Can we say what it 
means to "interpret" a text in the sense of any text, or can we say 
only what it means to "interpret" a specific kind of text? What do 
any of the following activities have in common, if anything, with 
any of the others: a critic interpreting a film, a homilist interpreting 
a scriptural passage, a biochemist interpreting laboratory data, a 
parent interpreting a child's facial expression, a pianist interpreting 
a concerto, an ethicist interpreting a moral tradition, an actor inter-
preting a dramatic role, a person whose sight has just been restored 
interpreting a flood of visual sense impressions, an anthropologist 
interpreting a ritual, a judge interpreting a constitutional provision, 
and so on? 
At least a few useful things can be said about interpretation 
which will serve us when we consider the debate between original-
ism and nonoriginalism. 
To try to "interpret" a text (or text-analogue) is to try to un-
derstand something that is, at the beginning, at least somewhat 
strange or alien; discern its meaning (or meanings, which may be 
varied); grasp its intelligibility(ies) (a basic aspect of which is the 
thing's embeddedness in a context). To try to interpret is to try to 
render intelligible, to contextualize in the sense of "place in a 
context. "6 
And to understand is to interpret. All understanding, even nat-
ural-scientific understanding, despite now-discredited positivist 
pretensions to the contrary, is interpretive or "hermeneutic." 
"Every time we act, deliberate, judge, understand, or even experi-
ence, we are interpreting. To understand at all is to interpret. "7 
None of this is to deny that there are significant differences 
among the various interpretive activities listed above (a critic inter-
preting a film, etc.), but only to observe there is something all such 
activities have in common. 
6. My former colleague Carol Rose has suggested that ''this 'placing in context"-and 
even more. 'locating in a different context"-is what Gadamer has in mind in saying that the 
quintessence of interpretation is translation. From the Latin /ranslalio: 'to move something 
from one place to another." .. 
7. D. TRACY, PLCRALITY A~D A\1BIGCtT' ( 1987). 
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To try to "interpret" a text is not necessarily to try to under-
stand it in the way the author of the text intended that it be under-
stood. First, as some of the interpretive activities listed above 
illustrate, not every text has an author-at least, not every text has 
an author in the conventional sense that some texts do. Second, 
even a text that has an author in the conventional sense can be un-
derstood in a way the author did not intend. Such an understand-
ing is a misunderstanding only if the aim is to ascertain what the 
author intended the text to mean. But sometimes that is demon-
strably not the aim of an interpreter. It is not invariably the aim of 
an interpreter of a scriptural passage, for example, or of a constitu-
tional provision, to ascertain what the author intended the text to 
mean. Sometimes the interpreter's aim is not "what the author in-
tended it to mean" but "what it means." 
What an author intended a text to mean may for one reason or 
another be impossible to ascertain. But it doesn't follow that the 
text doesn't have an ascertainable meaning. A text can be meaning-
ful independent of the author's intended meaning. Indeed, given 
that not every text has an author in the conventional sense, a text 
can be meaningful even if there is no author and therefore no au-
thor's intended meaning. But even if a text has an author in the 
conventional sense, what the author intended the text to mean-
that is, to mean to me, as one of its readers-is not necessarily what 
the text does in fact mean to me, after I've struggled to read, to 
interpret/understand, it. 
Is interpretation then an unconstrained activity-"arbitrary" 
or "willful"? Can an interpreter make a text mean whatever she 
wants it to mean? A few brief comments about the matter of inter-
pretation and constraint are in order. 
Imagine that you see in front of you something you conclude to 
be a small rubber ball. To see something as a small rubber ball is an 
act of interpretation. No human act is unconstrained. Every 
human act, including every act of interpretation, is constrained, 
even if the crucial constraints are sometimes "internal" (e.g., one's 
values) rather than "external" (e.g., inadequate lighting) and even if 
the constraints can't be specified. Moreover, to interpret something 
as one thing rather than another might be to make a mistake. To 
interpret something as a parachute rather than as a small rubber 
ball might be to make a fatal mistake. 
Assume that the small rubber ball is one with which we can 
play any of several games. The ball does not itself constrain us to 
play a particular game. To say "let's play ball" without otherwise 
indicating which game is not necessarily to suggest that a particular 
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game be played; it may be to suggest merely that some game be 
played-presumably one that can be played with the ball. (Of 
course, to say "let's play ball" may in context suggest that a particu-
lar game be played.) As contemporary debates in constitutional 
theory illustrate, the constitutional text is one with which we (in 
particular, the Court) can play more than one game.s 
Of course, our decision to play with the ball does rule out some 
games: those that require a different sort of ball and those that 
aren't played with a ball. One can't do just anything with a ball-
use it for a parachute, for example. Similarly, the constitutional 
text does not itself constrain us to play a particular game, although, 
of course, our decision to interpret the Constitution does rule out 
some interpretive games-those that require a different sort of text. 
It is difficult to see how three actors could interpret the Constitution 
in the sense they could interpret Sam Shepard's True West on stage. 
Suppose we do indeed decide to play a particular game. That 
decision is constrained and constraining: constrained just as every 
act is constrained, and constraining us to engage in the practices-
to "follow the rules"- constructive of the game in question. 
II 
What is the originalist game-the interpretive game that, ac-
cording to originalism, the Court should play with the constitu-
tional text? And what is the nonoriginalist game I'd have the Court 
play? (I hope it's clear I'm not using "game" in any demeaning or 
pejorative sense.) 
I've discussed originalism and nonoriginalism at length else-
where. Here, against the background of, and in part drawing on, 
that fuller discussion, I want merely to sketch enough of the two 
positions to clarify the disagreement between them with respect to 
the nature of constitutional "interpretation." 
In American political-legal culture it is axiomatic that the Con-
stitution is authoritative-indeed, supremely authoritative-in con-
8. See D. KELSEY, THE UsES OF SCRIPTURE IN RECENT THEOLOGY 151 (1975): 
(A] theologian's remark "Scripture is authority for theology," said in reference to 
biblical texts taken as scripture, is like a boy's exclamation "Come on, let's play 
ball," said in reference to a ball not evidently designed for use in any one ball-game 
in particular. It no more makes a claim about the texts than the boy's exclamation 
does about this ball; rather, it self-involvingly invokes an activity. In saying "Scrip-
ture is authority for theology," the theologian commits himself to participate in one 
or another of a family of activities called "doing Christian theology." Moreover, he 
thereby acknowledges and commits himself to observing a rule governing the prac-
tice of theology (on certain understanding of "theology"): In defending theological 
proposals, scripture shall be used in such a way that helps authorize the proposals. 
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stitutional adjudication. 9 That is, it is axiomatic that constitutional 
cases should be decided on the basis of the Constitution. Thus, in 
deciding constitutional cases judges should interpret the Constitu-
tion. This much is common ground between originalism and 
nonoriginalism. 
It is not axiomatic, however, what it means to say that the Con-
stitution is authoritative. According to originalism, what does it 
mean to say that the Constitution is authoritative; and, relatedly, 
what does it mean to "interpret" the Constitution? What does it 
mean to say that the Constitution is authoritative, and to "inter-
pret" the Constitution, according to nonoriginalism? 
All agree that the Constitution is a text, that those "marks on a 
page" are meaningful. What the Constitution means, to the 
originalist, is what it originally meant. Its meaning to the original-
ist is its original meaning. For the originalist, to enforce the Consti-
tution is to enforce it as originally understood (by the ratifiers, or 
the framers and ratifiers). 
For originalism, then, to "interpret" the Constitution is to as-
certain the original meaning-the norm the textual provision at is-
sue was originally understood to signify-and then to apply that 
norm to the conflict at hand. Thus, for originalism, the interpreta-
tion of a constitutional provision comprises two interpretive mo-
ments: a moment in which the original meaning/understanding of 
the provision is ascertained to the extent possible and a second mo-
ment in which the significance of that meaning for the conflict at 
hand is ascertained. 
One meaning of the constitutional text, to the nonoriginalist, is 
the original meaning. To the nonoriginalist, however, that is not 
the only meaning of the text. To many Americans, including me, 
the constitutional text is more than one thing. It is a communica-
tion to us from the ratifiers and framers. And, in virtue of a role it 
has come to play in the life of our political community-a role not 
necessarily foreseen, much less authorized, by any group of ratifiers 
and framers-the Constitution is also a symbol of fundamental aspi-
rations of the political tradition. Thus, were someone to ask me 
9. See Tribe. Conrrasring Consrirurional Visions: Of Real and Unreal Differences, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 95 (1987): "[F]or all the ballyhoo, overall approaches differ far 
less than might appear. Both Judge Robert Bork and I. for example, ... start with the 
recognition that any 'legitimate theory of constitutional adjudication begins from the premise 
that the Constitution is law,' and that it must therefore provide genuine constraints on 
choice." (Quoting Bork, Original /nrenr and rhe Consritution, HlJMA~ITIES. Feb. 1986. at 
22.) Cf Dworkin. The Bark lliomination, NEw YORK REv .. Aug. 13. 1987, at 3, 10: "[Judge 
Bark's] writings show no developed political philosophy ... beyond frequent appeals to the 
truism that elected legislators, not judges, ought to make law when the Constitution is silent. 
No one disputes that. of course: people disagree only about when the Constitution is silent." 
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what the equal protection clause means, I might say: "As a com-
munication to us from the ratifiers and framers of the fourteenth 
amendment, it means ... but as a symbol of a fundamental aspira-
tion of our political tradition, it means, it has come to mean, more 
than that; it means .... " There is, after all, no rule that a text must 
be one and only one thing to a person. Things are not so simple. 
Like some other texts (like every other text?), the constitutional text 
is polysemic. 
To the nonoriginalist, then, unlike the originalist, what the 
Constitution means is not merely what it originally meant. Some 
provisions of the constitutional text have a meaning in addition to 
the original meaning: Some provisions signify fundamental aspira-
tions of the American political tradition. Not every provision of the 
text signifies such aspirations, but some do. The least controversial 
examples of such provisions are probably the first amendment, sig-
nifying the tradition's aspirations to the freedoms of speech, press, 
and religion; the fifth amendment, signifying the aspiration to due 
process of law; and the fourteenth amendment, signifying the aspi-
rations to due process of law and to equal protection of the laws. 10 
For nonoriginalism, then, to "interpret" some provisions of the 
Constitution is in the main to ascertain their aspirational meaning 
I 0. Whether a particular constitutional provision is aspirational can be controversial, of 
course. To say-whether from the perspective of a participant observer in the political-legal 
culture, which is the judge's perspective, or from the perspective of the outsider, like de 
Tocqueville-that a particular provision does not signify a fundamental aspiration of the 
American political tradition is to say either. or both. of two things: (I) that the provision 
does not signify an aspiration: (2) that the aspiration the provision signifies is not now, if it 
ever was, a fundamental aspiration of the tradition. 
Nonoriginalism does not hold that every worthwhile aspiration is necessarily a funda-
mental aspiration of the tradition, much less signified by some provision of the constitutional 
text. Nor does it hold that every fundamental aspiration of the tradition is necessarily signi-
fied by some provision of the text. It does not even hold that every aspiration of the tradition 
signified by some textual provision is necessarily worthwhile. Why should a judge bring to 
bear, in constitutional cases, only aspirations signified by the text' Why not all fundamental 
aspirations, even those not signified by the text' Indeed, why not all worthwhile aspirations, 
even those not-fundamental aspirations of the American political tradition' If someone 
wants to claim that a judge should bring to bear all fundamental aspirations, or even all 
worthwhile aspirations, I want to hear the argument. (Inter alia. I'm curious to hear what 
fundamental aspirations are not signified by the text, and also what worthwhile aspirations 
are not fundamental aspirations of the tradition.) J1y argument is merely that a judge should 
bring to bear, in constitutional case5. only aspirations signified by the text. 
However, although I'm arguing that a judge should bring to bear only aspirations signi-
fied by the Constitution (as distinct from all fundamental aspirations or all worthwhile aspira-
tions). I'm not arguing that she should bring to bear every aspiration signified by the 
Constitution. As I remarked a moment ago, nonoriginalism does not presuppose that every 
aspiration signified by the Constitution is necessarily worthwhile. If a judge believes that an 
aspiration signified by some provision of the constitutional text is not worthwhile. then she 
has no reason to bring that aspiration to bear. She may, consistently with her oath. pursue 
the originalist approach to adjudication under the provision in question. 
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and then to bring that meaning to bear-that is, to answer the ques-
tion of what significance, if any, the aspiration signified by the rele-
vant provision has for the conflict at hand, what that aspiration 
means for the conflict at hand, what that aspiration if accepted re-
quires the court to do with respect to the conflict at hand.tt Thus, 
for nonoriginalism no less than for originalism, the interpretation of 
a constitutional provision comprises two interpretive moments: a 
moment in which the aspirational meaning of the provision is ascer-
tained and a second moment in which the significance of that mean-
ing for the conflict at hand is ascertained. 
As I've indicated, for both originalists and nonoriginalists con-
stitutional interpretation can be understood (analytically, if not, or 
not always, phenomenologically) as comprising two interpretive 
moments. Whereas the first moment yields a norm to be applied, 
the second moment yields the significance of that norm for the con-
flict at hand. In the second moment the norm yielded in the first 
moment is specified, it is rendered more determinate. We might say 
that in the first moment the objective is the "preliminary" meaning 
of the constitutional provision, and in the second moment the objec-
tive is the "final" meaning-final, that is, for the purposes of the 
case at hand. Whereas the preliminary meaning is relatively gen-
eral, abstract, formal, verbal, the final meaning is relatively particu-
lar, concrete, substantial, existential. 
The distinction between "preliminary" meaning and "final" 
meaning is not the same as the sharp distinction between "mean-
ing" and "application." Reliance on the former distinction is not 
inconsistent with David Hoy's point, in criticizing the latter distinc-
tion, that "[i]n finding that the text is at all intelligible, the moment 
of application ... has already taken place for us. A text only makes 
II. It seems invariably (though not necessarily) the case that the aspirational meaning 
of a constitutional provision, like the free speech clause of the first amendment, has grown out 
of the original meaning. The aspirational meaning has emerged over time-in the course of 
constitutional adjudication and, more generally, of political discourse. including political dis-
course precipitated by constitutional conflict and adjudication-as a progressive generaliza-
tion of the original meaning. (We need not fear that the aspirational meaning of the 
Constitution might permit what the original meaning forbids. As a progressive generaliza-
tion of the original meaning, the aspirational meaning does not permit what the original 
meaning forbids, though it forbids some of what the original meaning permits.) 
The point bears amplification: Constitutional adjudication in particular and political 
discourse in general are principal matrices of the Constitution's aspirational meaning to us; 
and constitutional precedent and, more generally. the ways in which political controversies, 
especially major ones, have been resolved-the story of the New Deal, for example, comes to 
mind-are pnncipal shaping influences on the contours of that meaning. Which constitu-
tional provisions signify aspirations? How can a judge knowry One important place to look, 
though not the only place. is constitutional case law. constitutional "precedent," not because 
such materials are necessarily authoritative, but because they are informative, illuminating as 
to which provisions are aspirational and as to the content of the aspirations. 
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sense insofar as it inheres in a context, and for us even to be able to 
understand the text at all, we must presuppose an understanding of 
that context .... [A] text is never apprehended independently of a 
context, but ... any understanding of the text has already found 
that the text applies in a shared context." 12 
My problem with the meaning/application distinction-at 
least in the conventional version Hoy takes on, according to which 
meaning is meaning and application is application and never the 
twain shall meet-is not only that meaning already always involves 
application (Hoy's point), but also that application is always a fur-
ther specification of meaning. Consider, for example, the principle 
that government may not deny anyone the equal protection of the 
laws. To say, in response to the question "What does the principle 
mean?," that government may not discriminate on the basis of 
race-or, more generally, that government may not discriminate on 
the basis of an "irrational prejudice"-is to begin to specify the 
meaning of the principle. For a court to conclude, in the context of 
a case, that the equal-protection principle forbids government to 
segregate public schools on the basis of race, or to outlaw interracial 
marriages, or to fence small-group homes for the mentally retarded 
out of residential neighborhoods, is to specify the meaning of the 
principle even further. In terms of the preliminary meaning/final 
meaning distinction, for both originalists and nonoriginalists final 
meaning is always a specification of preliminary meaning. 
Although, as I said, originalists and nonoriginalists agree that 
the constitutional text is authoritative in constitutional adjudica-
tion, they strenuously disagree about what it means to say that the 
text is authoritative. They disagree about that, we can now see, be-
cause they disagree about the meaning of the text. Whereas to the 
originalist the meaning of the constitutional text is singular-the 
meaning of the text is the original meaning-to the nonoriginalist 
the situation is more complicated. For reasons I've given else-
where, u a nonoriginalist judge is interested in the original meaning 
of the Constitution; to her, too, one meaning of the text is the origi-
nal meaning. But to a nonoriginalist judge that is not the text's only 
meaning. For the originalist, the constitutional text is authoritative 
in the sense that the original meaning is authoritative. For the no-
noriginalist, some provisions of the text are authoritative in the 
sense that their aspirational meaning-the aspirations they sig-
nify-is authoritative. To a nonoriginalist judge, the authoritative 
12. Hoy. A Hermeneutical Critique of the Origina/ism/.'Vonorigina/ism Distinction, 15 
N. KY. L. REV. 479, 493 (1988). 
13. SeeM. PERRY, MORAI.ITY, POLITICS AI'D LAW, 150-51 (1988). 
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meaning of some provisions of the constitutional text is not their 
narrow original meaning, but a broader present meaning-their as-
pirational meaning. 
III 
With this sketch of originalism and nonoriginalism, and of the 
difference between them, now behind us, let's turn to the question-
in-chief: How does constitutional theory matter to constitutional 
practice, if at all? In particular, how does the originalism debate 
about constitutional interpretation matter to constitutional prac-
tice? What is the real-world importance, the "cash value," of con-
stitutional-theoretical debate? Why should anyone care about 
constitutional theory (other than, of course, the theorists 
themselves)? 
What precisely is constitutional "theory"? "Theory" can mean 
different things. 14 Although theory does not invariably matter to 
practice, it sometimes does. Consider, for example, two contending 
epistemological theories in the philosophy of science: realism and 
conventionalism. Each theory constitutes a position on the issue of 
the relation, if any, between the fruit of (natural) scientific prac-
tice-i.e., scientific "truth" or "knowledge"-and reality as it is in 
itself, independent of however anyone, including any scientist, per-
ceives or conceives it. As it happens, neither theory is of much con-
sequence to contemporary scientific practice. No particle physicist, 
for example, is better of qua particle physicist for informing herself 
about, much less adopting a position with respect to, realist/con-
ventionalist debates in the philosophy of science. Scientific practice 
under-determines the choice between realist and conventionalist 
theories, it does not presuppose either a realist or a conventionalist 
position. So, theory does not always matter to practice. 
But constitutional theory is different. It does matter. In con-
trast to realist and conventionalist theories in the philosophy of sci-
ence, both originalism and nonoriginalism are primarily 
justificatory theories. Each aims to justify or revise (critique, re-
form, reject) constitutional practice. Of course, each must charac-
terize (and therefore interpret) the particular practice it then tries to 
justify or revise, but the characterization is part of the normative 
enterprise. Such theory is of great consequence to the practice that 
is its concern. Every judge who must sometimes adjudicate consti-
tutional conflicts is better off qua judge for attending to constitu-
tional-theoretical debates about constitutional interpretation. 
14. See Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1779 (1987). 
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Constitutional practice-that is, particular interpretive styles of or 
approaches to, constitutional discourse--often presupposes either 
an originalist or a nonoriginalist position. It often presupposes 
either an originalist or a nonoriginalist conception of proper judicial 
role. 
Constitutional theory, then, like normative political theory 
generally (of which it is a part), and unlike epistemological theories 
in the philosophy of science, is based upon a justificatory argument. 
A constitutional theory is an argument for or against a particular 
interpretive style of constitutional discourse that has been put in 
question, a style whose political-theoretical propriety or "legiti-
macy" has, for one reason or another, been challenged. 1 s It aims to 
justify or revise a particular style of constitutional discourse. Be-
cause a particular interpretive style entails a particular judicial 
role-the role constituted in part by the style-a constitutional the-
ory is partly a political-theoretical argument about proper judicial 
role. An interpretive style of constitutional discourse whose legiti-
macy is suspect-and the judicial role it partly constitutes-is 
harder to maintain and easier to oppose, politically as well as intel-
lectually, if there is no plausible justification for it, and easier to 
maintain and harder to oppose if there is. 
So, while theory does not always matter to the practice that is 
its concern, constitutional theory matters to constitutional practice. 
No particle physicist would be rejected as unfit for membership on 
the Board of the National Science Foundation because of her posi-
tion on epistemological issues contested in the philosophy of sci-
ence. Robert Bork, however, was rejected as unfit for membership 
on the Supreme Court principally because of his originalist position 
on issues contested in constitutional theory. His theoretical posi-
tion, unlike the particle physicist's, was relevant precisely because it 
mattered to, it had implications for, his practice-disturbing impli-
cations, in the view of many who voted against then-Judge Bark. 
To say that constitutional theory matters to constitutional 
practice is not to say that constitutional theory of every sort matters 
to constitutional practice of every sort. If the original understand-
ing of Congress's power "to regulate commerce among the several 
states," for example, was as broad or indeterminate as some histori-
ans have suggested, 16 then it is difficult to see how the original un-
derstanding differs in relevant respects from the present 
15. Cf Tushnet, Does Constitutional Theory .\1auer?: A Comment, 65 TEX. L. REv. 
777, 777 (1987): "My primary argument is that constitutional theory matters in the way that 
a fairly high fever matters-though it has no independent significance, it is a symptom of an 
underlying disorder in the body politic." 
16. See, e.g.. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns .\fore States Than One, 47 HAR\'. 
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understanding. That in the eighteenth century the framers and ra-
tifiers of the Constitution could not have imagined how in the twen-
tieth century Congress would use its commerce power does not 
entail that the original understanding of the commerce clause was 
different in relevant respects from the present understanding. Of 
course, there can still be basic disagreement as to how "activist" or 
how "deferential" the Supreme Court should be in enforcing the 
provision-for example, in enforcing the commerce clause against 
Congress. Should a Justice vote to strike down congressional legis-
lation as ultra vires under the commerce clause if she believes that 
Congress has exceeded its commerce power or only if she believes 
that no one could reasonably conclude otherwise? 
Such a debate about proper judicial role is not, however, the 
debate between originalism and nonoriginalism. The originalist/no-
noriginalist contest is a different debate about proper judicial role-
a debate about whether in constitutional adjudication judges should 
privilege the original understanding of a constitutional provision or, 
instead, the broader aspirational understanding. That contest is 
consequential in real-world terms only with respect to constitu-
tional provisions whose original understanding is not practically 
equivalent to their present understanding. 
IV 
Contemporary constitutional theory-as the centrality of the 
originalist/nonoriginalist debate illustrates-is principally con-
cerned with interpretation of provisions whose original and present 
understandings are different. Two such provisions are due process 
clause and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. A concrete illustration of how constitutional theory mat-
ters-in particular of how the contest between originalism and 
nonoriginalism matters-might be useful at this point. I want to 
indicate how the originalism debate matters to interpretation of the 
due process and equal protection clauses. 
First, the equal protection clause. There's no dispute about 
what the equal protection clause says. In the words of section one 
of the fourteenth amendment: "[N]or [shall any state] deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection ofthe laws." The 
dispute is about what the equal protection clause means.l 7 The 
L. REV. 1335 (1934). (I don't mean to suggest, however, that the position on the original 
understanding of the commerce clause defended by Stern and others is not controversial.) 
17. To ask about a constitutional provision-<Jr about any text-"What does it say?" is 
not the same as asking "What does it mean?" Yet, if what the provision says is sufficiently 
familiar (like a speed limit law) in the relevant community-if what it says is not alien or 
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phrase "the equal protection of the laws," unlike (for example) the 
phrase "thirty-five years of age," has no consensual or canonical 
meaning in the American political-constitutional community. 
Although it is difficult to say precisely how the equal protection 
clause was originally understood by those in the Congress who pro-
posed it and those in the states who ratified it, it seems unlikely that 
the clause was understood to do more than forbid any state to dis-
criminate on the basis of race (or, perhaps, of race or national an-
cestry). ts The present, aspirational understanding of equal 
protection is broader. According to this broader understanding, no 
strange-then we shouldn't be surprised if the question "What does it mean?" elicits the 
impatient reply "It means what it says!" Of course, this is not to deny that to say of the 
speed-limit law "It means what it says!" is to interpret the law/text, just to emphasize what 
the question "What does it mean?" is a real and explicit one when what the text says is at 
least a little alien or strange in the relevant community. To say of the equal protection clause 
that it means what it says is not very helpful, because in the American political-constitutional 
community the equal protection clause has no consensual or canonical meaning. What the 
clause says is more than a little alien or strange. Thus, the need to interpret the clause, to 
render it more familiar and hence usable, is obvious (in a way that the need to interpret the 
speed-limit Jaw is not obvious). 
18. Dworkin's suggestion that the framers of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment should be understood to have constitutionalized "the principle that gov-
ernment should not act out of prejudice against any group of citizens"-a principle, Dworkin 
emphasizes, that applies to everyone, women and homosexuals included, and not just to ra-
cial minorities (Dworkin, supra note 9, at 8}--seems to me less sensitive to available historical 
materials and more likely an instance of wishful thinking than Bork's suggestion that the 
framers of the equal protection clause should be understood to have constitutionalized a prin-
ciple against discrimination or prejudice on the basis of race. The reductio ad absurdum of 
Dworkin's way of (man)handling history is the suggestion that the framers of the equal pro-
tection clause-and of the first amendment and indeed of all constitutional provisions per-
taining to human rights-should be understood to have constitutionalized the principle that 
"government should not act unjustly." For a concise but powerful criticism of this aspect of 
Dworkin's theory of interpretation, see Alexander, Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Sur-
vey of Problems in Dworkin's Theory of Law, 6 LAW & PHILOSOPHY 419, 425 n.l4 (1987). 
So, a sophisticated originalism, sensitive to the insights of hermeneutics, readily ac-
knowledges that the judge can never retrieve the actual "original understanding," anymore 
than one person can come to see the world through another person's eyes (even if the other 
person is a contemporary). The sophisticated originalist is fully aware that the best the judge 
can do is construct an imagined "original understanding" by means of a counterfactual spec-
ulative act-the hypothetical conversation-that is sensitive to available historical materials. 
But, for the originalist, the best the judge can do is quite good enough. Cf Monaghan, Our 
Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 377 (1981): 
Although the difficulties of establishing original intent are formidable, they are 
by no means intractable. Significant difficulty in historical reconstruction is not 
present with respect to some constitutional provisions, and with respect to others it 
is at least partially ameliorated by the extensive body of precedent accumulated 
over the years by courts nearer in time to the origins of the relevant provision. 
Most importantly, the language of the Constitution itself remains. Whatever the 
difficulties, the language itself constitutes the best evidence of original intention. In 
any event, the core question remains: do the basic postulates of the constitutional 
order require that the court undertake the task of ascertaining original intent, as 
best it can? 
Trying to arrive at the original understanding, in the sense and way just indicated, is a 
far cry from, and far more legitimate (the originalist will want to insist) than pursuing an 
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state may discriminate against any person within its jurisdiction on 
the basis of any "irrational prejudice."'9 
Discrimination (by a state) based on sex, for example, simply 
does not implicate, much less violate, the equal protection clause as 
originally understood. In effect, section one of the fourteenth 
amendment, as originally understood, provides, in relevant part: 
"[N]or shall any state discriminate against any person within its 
jurisdiction on the basis of race." Thus, contemporary constitu-
tional doctrine regarding sex-based discrimination (for example) 
cannot be justified on the basis of the equal protection clause as 
originally understood. However, such discrimination does indeed 
implicate and sometimes may even violate the broader, aspirational 
understanding of equal protection.2o 
There is a real-and quite consequential-difference between, 
for example, constitutional reasoning that takes as its basic point of 
departure the principle that government may not discriminate on 
the basis of race and constitutional reasoning that takes as its point 
of departure the broader principle that government may not dis-
criminate on the basis of any "irrational prejudice." It is difficult to 
see how the former principle can ground a discursive challenge to 
discrimination based on sex. Isn't it almost certainly the case that if 
the fourteenth amendment only said instead that government may 
not discriminate on the basis of race, the Court would not have 
invalidated, in the name of that clause-the no-racial-discrimina-
interpretive path that rejects the ''in principle authoritativeness of the original understanding, 
which is what nonoriginalists do. 
19. See. e.g .. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985). 
20. Critics of the originalism/nonoriginalism distinction implausibly minimize the dif-
ference between the originalist interpretive style-the originalist approach to interpretation of 
a provision like, for example, the equal protection clause-and the nonoriginalist interpretive 
style/approach. They therefore minimize the difference between the products of the two ap-
proaches-between the original meaning of such a provision and the present, aspirational 
meaning. In terms of the two interpretive moments that constitutional interpretation com-
prises, critics of the originalism/nonoriginalism distinction minimize the difference between 
the "preliminary" meaning, to an originalist, of a constitutional provision like the equal pro-
tection clause and the "preliminary" meaning of the provision to a nonoriginalist. 
The difference in interpretive style/approach and the attendant difference in product/ 
meaning ought not to be minimized. They are differences that matter-differences that make 
a difference. As I indicated earlier, in trying to get at the preliminary meaning of a constitu-
tional provision-here. t!Ie equal protection clause-the originalist asks, first, how was the 
clause originally understood, what was its original meaning. In trying to get at the final 
meaning of the clause-final for purposes of the case at hand-she then inquires what the 
clause, as originally understood. means in the context of the case at hand. The nonoriginalist 
asks, with an eye on relevant precedent. not how was the clause originally understood, but 
how has the provision come to be understood. She then inquires what the clause, as now 
understood, means in the context of the case at hand. Clearly, the question "how was X 
originally understood' is not the same as the question "How has X come to be understood'" 
Nor is the answer to the first question necessarily the same as the answer to the second. 
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tion clause--classifications based on sex? (Notice, in that regard, 
that the "as is enjoyed by white citizens" language of section 1981 
and 1982 of Title 42 of the United States Code-provisions that 
derive from the Civil Rights Act of 1866-has effectively tied those 
provisions to race discrimination alone.)2 1 Well, given the original-
ist approach to the fourteenth amendment, the equal protection 
clause is-is tantamount to-a no-racial-discrimination clause; it 
means no more than that government may not discriminate on the 
basis of race. With respect to the equal protection clause and sev-
eral other important constitutional provisions regarding human 
rights, the distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism is 
consequential in real-world terms. 
Now, the due process clause. Again, the dispute is not about 
what the clause says but about what it means. Section one of the 
fourteenth amendment says, in relevant part: "[N]or shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law." The phrases "liberty" and "due process of law," like the 
phrase "the equal protection of the laws" but unlike the phrase 
"thirty-five years of age," have no consensual or canonical meaning 
in the American political-constitutional community. Although it is 
difficult to say precisely how the due process clause was originally 
understood by those in the Congress who proposed it and those in 
the states who ratified it, the clause was certainly not understood to 
be as broad as it is today. According to its present broad, aspira-
tional meaning, the due process clause governs not merely adjudica-
tive actions but legislative actions as well, not merely rule 
application but rule making. On this understanding, "due process 
of law" involves not merely constitutionally adequate ("due") adju-
dicative procedures but constitutionally legitimate ("due") legisla-
tive process as well, in the sense of legislative process that honors 
certain basic principles regarding human dignity. It's safe to say 
that a statute criminalizing abortion, or the use of contraceptives, or 
homosexual intimacy, does not implicate, much less violate, the 
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of "life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law" as originally understood. But 
such a statute does indeed implicate and may even violate the 
broader, aspirational understanding of "liberty" and "due process." 
Here, then, are two important examples of how constitutional 
theory-of how the choice between an originalist approach and a 
21 Section 1982. for example. provide' that: .. All citizens of the United States shall 
have the same right. in every State and territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to 
inherit, purchase. lease, sell. hold. and convey real and personal property.·· (My thanks to 
Gene Nichol for this point.) 
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nonoriginalist approach to interpretation of major constitutional 
provisions regarding human rights-matters to constitutional prac-
tice. Such examples call to mind the congressional hearings on 
Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court. Before his nomi-
nation, Bork, first as a law professor and then as a federal judge, 
had expressed deep skepticism about the constitutional pedigree of 
doctrines like, for example, due process regarding reproductive 
rights. Of course, given his originalism, the resistance Judge Bork 
encountered in the hearings is also easy to understand. As the poli-
ticians who voted to reject Judge Bark's nomination understood-
indeed, as the forces responsible for Judge Bork's nomination in the 
first place understood--constitutional theory matters.22 
v 
Finally, I want to relate my pro-theory position to the anti-
theory positions of Stanley Fish and Mark Tushnet, both of whom 
have argued-each for different reasons-that theory doesn't 
matter. 
First, Fish. It bears emphasis that a constitutional theory is 
not a "theory" in Stanley Fish's strong sense of the term: "an ab-
stract or algorithmic formulation that guides or governs practice 
from a position outside any conception of practice. A theory, in 
short, is something a practitioner consults when he wishes to per-
form correctly, with the term 'correctly' here understood as mean-
ing independently of his preconceptions, biases, or personal 
preferences. "23 Constitutional theories are not meant to be such 
22. In helpful correspondence, Rogers Smith has suggested "giv[ing] some concrete ex-
amples of what we would do differently in reaching a decision if we adopted one constitu-
tional theory rather than another-what sorts of things we could and should look at, what 
sorts of principles and arguments we could and should use. For example: if in adjudicat-
ing [the constitutionality of school segregation under the equal protection clause] I thought 
the intentions of the clause's authors mattered most, I would look at historical evidence of 
what they said and did on the subject. If I thought the ratifiers' intent mattered, I would look 
at different historical documents. If I thought the textual language as it would ordinarily 
have been understood at that time mattered, I would look at contemporary dictionaries and 
examples of uses of the term. If I thought evolving social mores should give meaning to the 
clause, I would try to identify. measure, or predict them. If I thought, as I do, that the equal 
protection clause requires us to judge if public institutions are reinforcing relative inequalities 
to such an extent that some persons do not have meaningful capacities to pursue or exercise 
fundamental liberties, then I would not only have to indicate what I take to be fundamental 
liberties and why, I would also have to look at empirical evidence on current conditions to 
determine if such extensive relative disparities do in fact exist. I think people will see that 
constitutional theories matter much more readily if [one] spell[s] out the quite different in-
quiries they call for in reaching a decision." Letter from Smith, to author (May 13, 1988). 
23. Fish, supra note 14, at 1779. See id. at 1777-79. Nor are epistemological theories in 
the philosophy of science "theories" in Fish's strong sense: They do not dominate scientific 
practice. See notes 14-18 and accompanying text. 
It bears emphasis. too, that a constitutional theory i'> not necessarily the sort of "grand" 
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theories or, therefore, to matter in the way such theories would 
matter, if they existed. (Do such theories exist? If they do, they are 
certainly not the sort of theories that should be taken seriously. 
Fish has picked an easy, but inconsequential, target.)24 
As I've indicated, a constitutional "theory" is best understood 
as a justification for or critique of some contested style of constitu-
tional practice (discourse). (As Fish acknowledges, "the word 'the-
ory' is often used in other, looser ways ... ").2s It is one thing to 
engage in the practice, another to engage in an effort to justify the 
practice. For a judge engaged in the process of deciding a constitu-
tional case, what is the relation between, on the one hand, her pres-
ent activity of engaging in a constitutional practice and, on the 
other, the separate activity-whether someone else's or her own at 
an earlier time-of trying to justify the practice? The relation is not 
the one Fish rejects: that the judge consults the theory "when she 
wishes to perform correctly, that is, independently of her precon-
ceptions, biases, or personal preferences." The relation, rather, is 
that the effort to justify the practice may well have led the judge to 
choose or shape the style of constitutional discourse-in which 
she's now engaged. 
Is it the case, then, that in that sense (i.e., the sense that an 
effort to justify a practice may lead one to choose one practice 
rather than another, or to shape a practice one way rather than 
another) constitutional theory dominates, that it is prior to, consti-
tutional practice? The relation between constitutional theory and 
constitutional practice is more complex than that. 
Mark Tushnet has recently commented on one prominent 
"reason for thinking that constitutional theory matters," namely, 
that constitutional theory "affects how judges will decide certain 
kinds of controversial cases. Thus, a judge who accepts Attorney 
General Edwin Meese's jurisprudence of original intent, for exam-
ple, would be less likely to sympathize with claims for substantial 
protection of novel forms of expressive activity than would a judge 
who accepted a different theory of constitutional interpretation."26 
Tushnet is skeptical: "The difficulty with this suggestion is that the 
most likely causal connection runs from prior political predisposi-
or ''foundationalist" theory Dan Farber has recently criticized. See Farber, Legal Pragma-
tism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988). (It seems to me that my constitu-
tional theory has much more in common with Farber's "pragmatist" approach to 
constitutional adjudication than with "grand theory.") Compare id. with M. PERRY, Mo-
RALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW ch. 6 (1988). 
24. See Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEo. L.J. 
37 (1987); Schlag, Theory and the Uses of Dennis Martinez, 76 GEO. L.J. 53 (1987). 
25. Fish, supra note 14, at 1779. 
26. Tushnet, supra note 15, at 778. 
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tion to preferred constitutional theory, rather than from theory to 
outcome. "27 
I'm enough of a realist to be sympathetic to Tushnet's point. 
Constitutional practice probably often dominates constitutional the-
ory in the way Tushnet indicates. Judges probably often gravitate 
to theories that support what they want to do-that is, to theories 
that support the interpretive styles of discourse they want to engage 
in. It is nonetheless true that, as I said earlier in this essay, an inter-
pretive approach to constitutional discourse whose legitimacy is 
suspect is harder to maintain and easier to oppose, politically as 
well as intellectually, if there is no plausible justification for it, and 
easier to maintain and harder to oppose if there is. Tushnet seems 
to recognize as much when he writes that "constitutional theory 
matters because it is one of the structures that defines the limits of 
our political discussions."2s If a contested interpretive style of con-
stitutional discourse cannot be justified, if it lacks an adequate sup-
porting theory, then its appeal in the public square is diminished. 
If, however, it has an adequate theory, or to the extent it does, its 
credibility is enhanced. 
In the title to this essay, I indicate that not only does constitu-
tional theory matter to constitutional practice, but vice versa. Con-
stitutional practice matters to constitutional theory. Indeed, there 
is an even deeper sense than Tushnet's in which constitutional prac-
tice dominates constitutional theory. As I've explained elsewhere, a 
constitutional theory-an effort to justify a particular interpretive 
style/judicial role-must rely in significant part both on (1) claims 
about what sorts of judicial decisions have been and likely would be 
the consequence of the style/role at issue, and on (2) evaluative 
judgments about the political-moral "rightness" or "correctness" of 
those decisions.29 A constitutional theory is incomplete to the point 
of being useless if it doesn't include arguments about the good the 
judiciary has achieved, on balance-and the good it will likely 
achieve, on balance-in employing the style at issue. In that sense, 
a constitutional theory relies on the very constitutional practice it 
seeks to justify. But there's no troublesome circularity here: It's 
quite natural to rely, in part, on the (actual and likely) conse-
quences of a practice in the course of trying to justify the practice. 
However, there is considerably more to a justification of a dis-
puted interpretive style of constitutional discourse than such claims 
and judgments about judicial decisions. As my own effort to justify 
27. Id. at 778-79. 
28. !d. at 787. 
29. SeeM. PERRY, supra note 23. at 166-69. 
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nonoriginalist constitutional discourse illustrates, such a justifica-
tion comprises arguments about a variety of other matters: for ex-
ample, the moral character of our political tradition and 
community, the nature of politics, the tension between our commit-
ment to "popular sovereignty" and our commitment to "liberty and 
justice for all," and judicial self-restraint.Jo 
Therefore, neither constitutional practice nor constitutional 
theory is either prior or posterior to the other. The relation between 
constitutional theory and constitutional practice is one of interde-
pendence: A constitutional theory is an effort to justify a constitu-
tional practice-to justify, that is, a particular interpretive style/ 
judicial role. And, as I just indicated, we rely on constitutional 
practice-we rely, that is, on historical and predictive claims and on 
moral judgments about the consequences of the style/role at issue-
as a part of our constitutional-theoretical enterprise, or justificatory 
effort. 
That's why constitutional theory matters to constitutional 
practice. And vice versa. 
30. See id., ch. 6. 
